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Abstract. We study the theory of safety and liveness in a reversible calculus
where reductions are totally ordered and rollbacks lead the systems to past states.
Similar to previous work on communicating transactions, liveness and safety re-
spectively correspond to the should-testing and inverse may-testing preorders. We
develop fully abstract models for these preorders in a reversible calculus, which
are based only on forward transitions, thus providing a simple proof technique
for refinement of such systems. We show that with respect to safety, total re-
versibility is a conservative extension to CCS. With respect to liveness, however,
adding total reversibility to CCS distinguishes more systems. To our knowledge,
this work provides the first characterisations of safety and liveness, and the first
testing theory for a reversible calculus.
1 Introduction
A reversible system is a system that can execute forwards but also backwards, reversing
the effects of its computations. Systems that can go back to past states appear in different
disciplines, including fault-tolerant systems [8], reverse debugging [9], transactional
systems [20], and computational biology [2]. Moreover, there is recent interest in low
energy reversible computing based on Landauer’s principle [11, 1], which states that
only information loss in irreversible computation needs to consume energy.
Despite the wide interest in reversibility [3, 16, 13], its underlying behavioural the-
ory is still not clear. Lanese et al. [13] have observed that, surprisingly, strong barbed
congruence [15], the behavioural equivalence most closely related to bisimulation, is a
too coarse relation for a reversible calculus (even more in the weak case). On the other
hand, if the equivalence distinguishes the direction of reductions (backward or forward),
as in the case of back and forth bisimulation [16], the resulting equivalence is too fine
as it coincides with history-preserving bisimulation. Thus bisimulation-based relations
seem to be unsatisfactory notions of behavioural equivalence in reversibility.
In the presence of non-determinism, many alternatives to bisimulation-based be-
havioural equivalences exist [19]. The most common ones are may- and must-testing [5]
and should-testing [17] preorders. The may-testing preorder is known to correspond to
the preservation of safety properties. To briefly explain this, consider a safety property
P which expresses that “something bad will not happen” [10]. Safety properties are ex-
actly the properties enforced by monitors [18], which can be thought of as test processes
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supported by Science Foundation Ireland grant 13/RC/2094.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
05
55
5v
2 
 [c
s.L
O]
  2
9 J
ul 
20
16
running in parallel with the system, reporting property violations on a special channel
ω. Thus, if M @∼safe N and T is the monitor of P , if the parallel composition N ‖ T
can output on ω (i.e., one execution of N violates the property monitored by T ) then
M ‖ T can also output on ω. This means that N @∼may M according to may-testing.
Similarly, preservation of liveness properties can be expressed using the must- or the
should-testing preorder. In this case tests report on ω “when something good eventually
happens”. However there is a subtle difference between the two testing preorders. In
must testing, if M ‖ T can diverge without an output on ω, the test fails. The intuition
is that M has an execution where the “something good” will not eventually happen.
This is a problem in reversibility because a reversible term can infinitely go back and
forth between adjacent states, thus it fails every must-test.
On the other hand,M passing a should-test T requires that all future states ofM ‖ T
have the potential to output on ω (perhaps after performing some reductions). In a sense
this requires that ω is always enabled. If this is the case in an infinite execution, and we
assume that infinitely enabled outputs are bound to happen (a fairness assumption), then
the success criterion of should testing is justified. Expressing the preservation of live-
ness properties using should-testing is suitable even for reversible languages. Therefore,
in this paper we develop the theory of safety and liveness preservation in terms of the
inverse may-testing and should-testing preorders, respectively.
Our model of safety preservation is (inverse) forward trace inclusion, identical to
classic CCS. This means that reversibility is a conservative extension of CCS with re-
spect to safety. Perhaps not surprisingly, this result relies on the property that any state
reachable from an initial system can be also reached with forward moves only. This
property can be shown to hold in other reversible calculi (e.g., [3, 4, 12]) where our
safety model also applies, but it does not hold in communicating transactions [7].
For liveness preservation, however, it is unclear that models of forward traces are
sound. For example the CCS system M = νa.(a.c.0 ‖ a.0 ‖ a.0) fails the liveness
test T = c.ω because M ‖ T −⇀ νa.(a.c.0 ‖ 0 ‖ 0) ‖ c.ω which is deadlocked and
cannot reach ω. On the other hand, system N = νa.(a.c.0 ‖ a(γ).rl〈γ〉 ‖ a.0) (where
γ is a decoration of the a-input and rl〈γ〉 rolls back this input) passes T because the
a-reduction that led to deadlock in M can be reversed in N .
The question now becomes: does a sound characterisation of the liveness preorder
need to consider the full generality of the reversible transition system and explore all
states reachable with forward and backward transitions? We answer this question to the
negative, providing a simple model for the liveness preorder. This model is based on
a novel definition of tree refusals, and only requires us to consider the forward transi-
tions of systems and a very limited set of rollback actions. This makes liveness easy to
understand and provides a simple proof technique of liveness preservation.
In Sections 2 and 3 we respectively present CCSroll and the contextual preorders
for safety and liveness. In Section 4 we describe the two crucial semantic properties
for the soundness of our forward-transition models of the preorders. In Section 5 we
give a compositional semantics in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) for for-
ward moves and key results on LTS traces necessary for the models of the preorders
(Sections 6 and 7). Section 8 contains related work and conclusions. 3
3 Technical details of results presented here can be found in an online report [14].
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α ::= τ | a ι ::= k | γ a, b, . . . ∈ Name k, l ∈ Key γ, δ ∈ KeyVar
P,Q ::=
∑
i∈I αi(γ).Pi | P ‖ Q | νa.P | recX(γ).P | X | rl〈ι〉 (Proc)
M,N ::= 0 | νa.M | M ‖ N | k:P | [µ; k] (Sys)
µ ::= k:
∑
i∈I αi(γ).Pi | k:recX(γ).P (Mem)
k:νa.P = νa.k:P k:(P ‖ Q) = k:P ‖ k:Q (1)
0 ‖ A = A A ‖ B = B ‖ A (A ‖ B) ‖ C = A ‖ (B ‖ C) (2)
(νa.0) = 0 (νa.A) ‖ B = νa.(A ‖ B) (when a ] B) νa.νb.A = νb.νa.A (3)
Fig. 1. CCSroll Syntax and Structural Equivalence Axioms.
2 The Language CCSroll
The language CCSroll extends CCS with a form of controlled reversibility, where reduc-
tions are totally ordered and systems can be programmed to return to any previous state.
As in CCS, synchronisation between processes occurs over channel names (Name) ac-
cording to a total, irreflexive bijection ( · ) over Name. Unlike CCS, unique keys (Key)
are used to identify and roll back synchronisation and internal (τ ) reductions.
The CCSroll syntax is shown in fig. 1 and is organised in two levels: processes and
systems. Processes (Proc) include standard CCS processes for infinite choice operator∑
i∈I αi(γ).Pi, where I is an indexing set
4; parallel composition P ‖ Q; name restric-
tion νa.P ; recursive process definition, process variable and a rollback primitive rl〈ι〉.
A key variable γ decorates both prefix and recursion. When a prefix is reduced (or a
recursion in unfolded), γ is replaced with a fresh key k in the continuation. From this
point, the process can roll back to the state before this reduction by executing rl〈k〉.
Systems (Sys) are build up from named processes k:P and memories [µ; k]. In k:P
the key k identifies the reduction that produced P , which may be shared with other
processes produced by the same reduction. A memory [µ; k] records that the named
process µ was involved in the k-reduction. If a past k-reduction was a synchronisation,
the current system will contain two memories [µ1; k] and [µ2; k] recording the named
processes that synchronised. Otherwise the k-reduction was internal (i.e. either a τ pre-
fix or a recursive process unfold) and the system will contain only one memory of the
form [µ; k]. We make use of two structural equivalences over A,B,C ∈ Sys ∪ Proc.
Definition 1 (Structural Equivalences). Limited structural equivalence ($) for sys-
tems is defined to be the least equivalence satisfying the axioms (1) of fig. 1 and closed
under parallel (− ‖ −) and name restriction (νa.−). Structural equivalence (≡) is
obtained by also requiring the axioms (2) and (3) of fig. 1.
The reduction semantics of CCSroll is defined by transitions between configurations
of the form D `M , where D is a dependency history, recording the order of reductions
and derived by the following grammar:
D ::= ε | k ≺D (if k ] D)
4 By convention when I = ∅ we have∑i∈I αi(γ).Pi = 0.
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Rα
j ∈ I k ] (Pi)i∈I∑
i∈I αi(γ).Pi
αj(k)7−−−→ Pj
{
k
/
γ
} RREC k ] P
recX(γ).P
τ(k)7−−−→ P ′{recX(γ).P/X}{k/γ}
RSYNC
P
a(k)7−−−→ P ′ Q a(k)7−−−→ Q′ k ] (k1, k2, P,Q)
k1:P ‖ k2:Q (k)−−⇀ k:P ′ ‖ k:Q′ ‖ [k1:P ; k] ‖ [k2:Q; k]
Rτ
P
τ(k)7−−−→ P ′ k ] k0
k0:P
(k)−−⇀ k:P ′ ‖ [k0:P ; k]
RPAR
M
(k)−−⇀M ′ k ] N
M ‖ N (k)−−⇀M ′ ‖ N
Rν
M
(k)−−⇀M ′
νa.M
(k)−−⇀ νa.M ′
REQV
M ≡ N N (k)−−⇀ N ′ N ′ ≡M ′
M
(k)−−⇀M ′
RSYS
M
(k)−−⇀M ′ k ] D
D `M (k)−−⇀ k ≺D `M ′
FW
D `M (k)−−⇀ D′ `M ′
D `M −⇀ D′ `M ′
Fig. 2. Reduction Semantics: Forward Rules.
The side-condition guarantees that each k in a dependency history is recorded at most
once. We writeD≺D′ for the concatenation ofD andD′, and k˜≺D for k1≺. . . kn≺D.
We also write k ≺D l when D = D1 ≺ k ≺ l≺D2. When the dependency history D is
clear from the context we will write k ≺ l instead of k ≺D l.
Before a configuration starts running, it contains no memories and no keys corre-
sponding to past reductions. We call these configurations initial. To abide to the syntax
for systems we consider one special key ε which is used to annotate processes in initial
systems of the form M $ ε:P . A configuration D ` M is initial if M $ ε:P and
D = ε. In the following we use standard CCS abbreviations, such as o˜ for a sequence
o1, . . . , on, where n is implicit. We write keys(o) for the set of keys in o except for ε,
and o1 ] o2 when keys(o1) ∩ keys(o2) = ∅. We omit variables γ when not used.
The reduction relation of CCSroll→ (over configurations) is defined as the union of
the forward reduction relation −⇀ and the backward, or rollback, relation ↪−→. Relations
−⇀ and ↪−→ are given in figs. 2 and 3.
A forward reduction takes the form D `M −⇀ D′ `M ′, and it is derived from
rules FW and RSYS of fig. 2 only when D′ = k ≺ D and M (k)−−⇀ M ′. The key k is
fresh (k ] D,M ) and uniquely identifies the reduction. The rules deriving M
(k)−−⇀ M ′
are adapted from CCS. Note that rule (RSYNC) generates two memories, each one con-
taining the named process contributing to the synchronisation and the fresh key k. Rule
(Rτ ) generates one memory containing the named process performing the internal ac-
tion along with the key of the reduction. When a prefix is reduced (via rule Rα or RREC)
the bound variable γ is substituted with the new key in the continuation of the process,
replacing free occurrences of γ in terms rl〈γ〉, allowing the roll-back of the reduction.
A backward reduction D `M ↪−→ D′ `M ′ is derived from rule BW of fig. 3 only
when a rollback of k is active in M (i.e. M ≡ l:rl〈k〉 ‖ N ). In CCSroll actions are
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RLMEM1
[µ; k]
〈k〉
↪−−→ µ
RLMEM2
k ] k′, µ
[µ; k′]
〈k〉
↪−−→ [µ; k′]
RLPROC1
k:P
〈k〉
↪−−→ 0
RLPROC2
k ] k′, P
k′:P
〈k〉
↪−−→ k′:P
RLNIL
0
〈k〉
↪−−→ 0
RLν
M
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′
νa.M
〈k〉
↪−−→ νa.M ′
RLPAR
M
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′ N 〈k〉↪−−→ N ′
M ‖ N 〈k〉↪−−→ N ′ ‖M ′
RLSYS
M
〈k1〉
↪−−→ · · · 〈kn〉↪−−−→M ′
(k1 ≺ . . .≺ kn ≺D) `M 〈kn〉↪−−−→ D `M ′
BW
M ≡ l:rl〈k〉 ‖ N D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ `M ′
D `M ↪−→ D′ `M ′
Fig. 3. Reduction Semantics: Backward Rules.
totally ordered, and their identifying keys are stored in the dependency history D. Re-
verting a k-action reverts all actions that came after it (RLSYS). Each reduction of the
form M
〈k〉
↪−−→ N is derived from the rules in the first part of fig. 3, which broadcast
the k-rollback throughout M . Processes and memories in M that do not contain k are
left unaffected by this transition; k-processes disappear and k-memories reinstate their
contents. We write
(k˜)−−⇀ and 〈k˜〉↪−−→ for (k1)−−⇀ . . . (kn)−−−⇀ and 〈k1〉↪−−→ . . . 〈kn〉↪−−→, respectively.
In CCSroll, rollbacks are deterministic. Moreover, any forward k-reduction can be
rolled back, and when this happens the configuration returns to the state before the
k-reduction, up to structural equivalence.
Lemma 1 (Deterministic Rollback). Let D ` M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ ` M ′ and D ` M 〈k〉↪−−→
D′′ `M ′′. Then D′ = D′′ and M ′ =M ′′.
Lemma 2 (Rollback a Forward Reduction). If D `M (k)−−⇀ (l˜)−⇀ D′ `M ′ then there
exists M ′′ such that D′ `M ′ 〈k〉↪−−→ D `M ′′ and M ≡M ′′.
To establish more properties for configurations we require them to be well-formed.
Definition 2 (Well-Formed Config.). D `M is well-formed, written wf(D `M), if
1. Key Compatibility: keys(M) ⊆ keys(D),
2. Rollback Loop: if D = k ≺ D′ then M 〈k〉↪−−→ M ′ (k)−−⇀ M and wf(D′ `M ′), for
some M ′.
This definition guarantees that in a configuration D `M , keys in M were produced by
a past reduction recorded in D, and any such reduction can be rolled back and repeated
obtaining the same system. These properties are sufficient to describe well-behaved
systems, simplifying the definitions of previous work [12].
Well-formedness is preserved by structural equivalence and reductions. This, to-
gether with the fact that initial configurations are trivially well-formed, allows us to
implicitly assume configuration to be well-formed in the following sections.
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M1 = ε:a.(b.0+ c.0) M2 = ε:(a.b.0+ a.c.0)
M3 = ε:a.(b.c.0+ b.d.0) M4 = ε:(a.b.c.0+ a.b.d.0)
M5 = ε:a.(b(γb).rl〈γb〉+ c.0) M6 = ε:a(γa).(b.rl〈γa〉+ c.0)
Fig. 4. Examples.
3 Safety and Liveness Preorders
In this section we give the definitions of the safety and liveness preorders, and examples
of their use. As we discussed in the introduction, the safety preorder corresponds to the
inverse may-testing preorder [5] and the liveness preorder corresponds to the should-
testing preorder [17]. Here we use tests T derived from the grammar of processes, with
the addition of a special name ω used by the test to report an outcome.
Definition 3 (Basic Observable (barb)). D `M has a strong barb, written D `M↓ω ,
if M ≡ N ‖ k : ω and a (weak) barb written D `M⇓ω , if D `M →∗ D′ `M ′↓ω .
We are interested in testing initial configurations; the composition of a configuration
ε`M with a test T is ε`M ‖ ε:T . We start with safety. A safety test T can be thought of
as a monitor enforcing a safety policy. When T reports an error on ω then the enforced
safety policy has been violated by the system. Thus, a system M passes a safety test T
when their parallel composition cannot report a violation on ω. This, in negative form,
means that M fails T if ε `M ‖ ε:T⇓ω . System M is potentially “less safe” than N
when M has at least the violations of N .
Definition 4 (Safety Preorder). For two initial systemsM andN we writeM @∼safe N
when for all tests T , ε `N ‖ ε:T⇓ω implies ε `M ‖ ε:T⇓ω .
On the other hand, we can consider liveness tests that report on ω when “something
good” happens. A system M passes a liveness test T when their parallel composition
has no way of failing the test. According to should-testing [17], a system passes a test
if at any reachable state, success is reachable; M is potentially “less live” than N if N
passes every liveness test that M passes.
Definition 5 (Passing a Liveness Test & Liveness Preorder). An initial system M
passes the liveness test T , written M shd T , when ε `M ‖ ε:T →∗ D ` N implies
D `N⇓ω , ∀D,N . For two initial systems M and N we write M @∼ live N when for all
liveness tests T , M shd T implies N shd T .
In the example systems in fig. 4, M1 and M2 are CCS processes. In CCS these are
safe-equivalent because they have the same traces. With respect to the liveness preorder,
also in CCS, M2 @∼ live M1 but M1 6@∼ live M2 because M1 passes T = ω+ a.b.ω but M2
does not: after a communication on a, M2 ‖ T can become c.0 ‖ b.ω, which cannot
reach ω. The same is true in CCSroll. The following conservative extension theorem
holds for safety in CCSroll– its proof relies in the models for safety in the two languages.
Theorem 1. Let P and Q be CCS processes with P @∼
CCS
safe
Q; then ε:P @∼
CCSroll
safe
ε:Q.
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TermsM3 andM4 of fig. 4 show why CCSroll is not a conservative extension of CCS
with respect to liveness. In CCSM3 is safe-equivalent toM4 [17, Ex. 34], however these
terms can be distinguished in CCSroll by test T = ω+ a.τ(γ).(rl〈γ〉 ‖ b.d.ω). System
M3 passes this test because if, while communicating with T , it chooses the “wrong” b-
branch b.d.0, the rollback in the test reverses this choice and ω is reachable. On the other
hand,M4 can communicate with T using branch a.b.d.0 where ω will not be reachable;
the rollback in the test cannot reverse this choice. For a similar reason, M5 and M6 are
safe- but not live-equivalent. System M6 passes the liveness test T = ω + a.b but M5
does not; the rollback of the a-communication in M6 makes ω to always be reachable.
4 Important Properties of Forward Reductions
Our safety and liveness models rely on two semantic properties. The first is that, starting
from any system, any state reachable with arbitrary reductions can also be reached with
only forward reductions after at most one backward move. Thus, all states of an initial
system, which has no backward moves, can be reached with only forward reductions.
The consequence of this is that forward traces are sufficient to characterise safety.
This property also holds in any calculus whose reversibility machinery is causally con-
sistent, thus our forward-only model of safety applies to other reversible systems.
Lemma 3. Let D `M →∗ D′ `M ′. Then one of the following holds:
1. D `M −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′, for some M ′′, or
2. D `M 〈l〉↪−→ D0 `M0 −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′, and D `M →∗ D0 `M ′0 ≡M0, for
some l ∈ D, D0, M ′′, M0, M ′0.
Property 1 Let ε `M →∗ D′ `M ′. Then ε `M −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′, for some M ′′.
This property is also necessary for the characterisation of liveness. However we also
need to establish a result for tree failures [17]: if an initial configuration can reach a state
D ` N from which it fails to reach an ω-action, then the same original configuration
should be able to reach a failure stateD1`N1 where all reachable states can be reached
with forward reductions. This allows us to use a forward LTS to encode liveness.
Property 2 Let ε `M −⇀∗ D `N 6⇓ω and keys(M) = ∅; there exist D1 and N1:
1. ε `M −⇀∗ D1 `N1 6⇓ω
2. ifD1`N1 →∗ D′`N ′ then there existsN ′′ such thatD1`N1 −⇀∗ D′`N ′′ ≡ N ′
In CCSroll, where reductions are temporally dependent, we can show that once we
reach the stateD`N we can explore all past states reachable with rollbacks fromD`N
and pick the oldest one. Because of the total temporal ordering of reductions we know
that there is always a single oldest state (up to structural equivalence≡)D1`N1. Since
no older state is reachable, all states reachable from D1 `N1 can be reached with only
forward reductions.
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Tα
P
α(k)7−−−→ P ′ k ] D
D |= l:P a(k)−−−→ (k ≺D) |= k:P ′ ‖ [l:P ; k]
TSYNC
D |=M a(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′
D |=N a(k)−−−→ D′ |=N ′
D |=M ‖ N τ(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ ‖ N ′
Fig. 5. LTS Transitions Based on Forward Moves.
5 Compositional Semantics
Our characterisation of safety and liveness in CCSroll is based on a compositional La-
belled Transition System (LTS) of forward transitions between compositional configu-
rations of the form D |=M , greatly simplifying reasoning. We let C range over com-
positional configurations. The LTS transition relation
α(k)−−−→ is defined as the smallest
relation derived from fig. 5, closed under $, parallel and restriction, provided that k in
the label is fresh.
These transitions, besides internal reductions, can describe the interaction of a part
of a system with its environment, which we call the observer. We assume the adapta-
tion of the definition of well-formed configurations to compositional configuration and
work with well-formed compositional configurations. As expected, forward reductions
correspond to τ -transitions in the LTS.
Theorem 2. D `M (k)−−⇀ D′ `M ′ iff D |=M τ(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′′ with M ′′ ≡M ′.
Our theory is based on canonical traces; t is canonical if each key in t appears at
most once in t. A trace is a dependency history transformer and can be typed as such.
Definition 6 (Trace Typing). We write (D ` t . D′) for the predicate defined by the
following rules:
(D `  . D) (D ` α(k), t . D′) if (k ≺D ` t . D′)
We will treat (D ` t . D′) as a typed trace; this formalism helps us to synchronise
dependency histories with traces. Canonical traces are typable, provided they use new
keys, and any typed trace is canonical.
Traces encode both the observable and internal (τ ) actions of a system. Systems
related by the safety and liveness preorders may have traces that differ in their internal
actions. We write obs(t) to denote the sub-trace of t containing only observable actions.
obs() =  obs(τ(k), t) = obs(t) obs(a(k), t) = a(k), obs(t)
We say that a trace t is observable when obs(t) = t. We write t to denote the same-
length trace derived from t by applying ( · ) to all non-τ actions. If t1 = t2 then we
call t1 and t2 complementary. A single LTS transition of two parallel systems can be
decomposed to either a transition of one of the systems, or a synchronisation between
them. This leads to a general decomposition of the trace of two parallel systems.
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ε ‖ ε  ε (Zε)
D1 ‖ (k ≺D2) k ≺D if D1 ‖ D2  D and k ] D1, D2 (ZR)
(k ≺D1) ‖ (k ≺D2) k ≺D if D1 ‖ D2  D and k ] D1, D2 (ZSYNC)
ZT
D1 ‖ D2  D
(D1 `  . D1) ‖ (D2 `  . D2) (D `  . D)
ZTR
(D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (k ≺D2 ` t2 . D′2) (k ≺D ` t . D′)
(D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` α(k), t2 . D′2) (D ` α(k), t . D′)
ZTSYNC
(k ≺D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (k ≺D2 ` t2 . D′2) (k ≺D ` t . D′)
(D1 ` a(k), t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` a(k), t2 . D′2) (D ` τ(k), t . D′)
Fig. 6. Definition of Zipping Traces and Histories (Symmetric rules of ZTR and ZR are omitted).
Proposition 1 (Unzipping). Let D |=M ‖ N t−→ D′ |= R′ and obs(t) =  and D1 ‖
D2  D. There exist M ′, N ′, D′1, D′2, t1, t2 such that
D |=M t1−→ D′1 |=M ′ (D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (D ` t . D′)
D |=N t2−→ D′2 |=N ′ R′ $M ′ ‖ N ′ obs(t1) = obs(t2)
Conversely, if two systems can perform typed traces that can be zipped into a single
zipped trace, then the parallel composition of these systems can perform this trace.
Proposition 2 (Zipping). Let D1 |=M t1−→ D′1 |=M ′ and D2 |=N t2−→ D′2 |=N ′ and
(D1`t1.D′1) ‖ (D2`t2.D′2) (D`t.D′). ThenD|=M ‖ N t−→ D′|=R′ $M ′ ‖ N ′.
6 Model of the Safety Preorder
We now show that the safety preorder coincides with inverse observable trace inclusion.
Definition 7 (Trace Set). We write Tr(C) for the largest set of observable traces such
that t ∈ Tr(C) when there exists t′ and C′ such that obs(t′) = t and C t
′
−→ C′.
Observable traces correspond to the class of safety tests defined by the rules:
Tests() = ω Tests(a(k), t) = a.Tests(t)
Lemma 4. Let t be an observable trace; then
1. there exist D, T such that ε ` Tests(t) t−→ D ` T↓ω;
2. if ε ` Tests(t) t
′
−→ D ` T↓ω then there exists a permutation p such that t = pt′.
Our characterisation of the safety preorder is the inverse of the following trace preorder.
Definition 8 (Trace Preorder). For initial systemsM@∼trN if Tr(|=M) ⊆ Tr(|=N).
Theorem 3 (Soundness and Completeness). M @∼tr N iff N @∼safe M .
It is now easy to check that systems M1, M2, M5 and M6 from fig. 4 are pairwise
safe-equivalent because they have the same observable traces, and so are M3 and M4.
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7 Model of the Liveness Preorder
Our model of the liveness preorder is based on forward traces but includes the following
basic observable for rollback actions, determined entirely by the structure of terms.
Definition 9 (Rollback Barb). If ∆ is a set of keys, we write D |= M↓rl〈∆〉 when
∃k ∈ ∆ such that M ≡ l:rl〈k〉 ‖ N , for some l, N . We let D |= M↓rl〈D′〉 mean
D |=M↓rl〈keys(D′)〉.
Based on this basic observable for rollbacks, we define the set of observable traces
of a configuration C which lead to a rollback of an action before C.
Definition 10 (Rollback Traces). Roll(D |= M) is the set of observable traces for
which t ∈ Roll(D |= M) iff there exists t′ such that obs(t′) = t and D |= M (t
′)−−⇀
D′ |=M ′↓rl〈D〉.
Lemma 5. Roll(D |=M) ⊆ Tr(D |=M).
The main structure of our liveness model is a tree refusal [17] adapted for reversibility.
Definition 11 (Tree Refusal). A tree refusal is a tuple (t;V ;W ), where:
1. t is an observable trace, and V and W are sets of observable traces,
2.  ∈ V and V is prefix-closed,
3.  6∈W and W ⊆ V .
4. V and W are closed under permutation of keys.
A tree refusal (t;V ;W ) encodes how an initial system M can fail a liveness test T :
– M communicates with T according to the actions in t and together reach the state
D `N . From this state, an ω output is not reachable and the liveness test fails.
– At this state the test is offering to communicate on the traces in W and then output
on ω. Thus, the system cannot perform the traces in W . Since any system can
perform the empty trace,  6∈W .
– If the state D ` N is rolled back the test will reach an ω output. Moreover, at this
state, all the traces that the test is offering to communicate are in V , including those
in W ; note that every test offers the empty trace ( ∈ V ). Thus the system should
not be able to roll back state D `N while communicating with the test over V . If
the test can roll back D `N over a trace t0, we add t0 ∈W .
Tree refusals correspond to the following class of characteristic liveness tests.
Definition 12 (Characteristic Liveness Tests).
Testl(;V ;W )
def
= ω + τ.Testl(V ;W ) Testl(a(k), t;V ;W )
def
= ω + a.Testl(t;V ;W )
Testl(V ;W )
def
= τ(γ).
 ∑
t1∈(V \W )
Testl(t1; 0)
+(∑
t2∈W
Testl(t2;ω)
)
‖ rl〈γ〉

Testl(;P )
def
= P Testl(a(k).t;P )
def
= a.Testl(t;P )
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An initial system fails Testl(t;V ;W ) only by communicating with the test along
the trace t, thus reducing the test to Testl(V ;W ). From this state, an ω is reachable
only if the system communicates with the test along a trace t2 ∈ W , or if the system
rolls back to a previous state along any of the traces in V which contains W . The rl〈γ〉
is used to non-deterministically bring the test to state Testl(V ;W ), thus avoiding the
deadlock of system and test while communicating along a strict prefix of a trace in V .
Definition 13 (Refusal Set). Let M be an initial system; Ref(M) is the largest set of
tree refusals with the property that if (t;V ;W ) ∈ Ref(M), there exist t′ and C s.t.:
obs(t′) = t and ε |=M (t
′)−−⇀ C and V ∩ Roll(C) =W ∩ Tr(C) = ∅
Lemma 6 (Refusals to Traces). If (t;V ;W ) ∈ Ref(M) then t ∈ Tr(M).
Definition 14 (Refusal Preorder). For initial systems,M @∼ ref N if Ref(M) ⊆ Ref(N).
Theorem 4 (Soundness and Completeness). M @∼ live N iff N @∼ ref M .
Let us revisit fig. 4: M1 6@∼ live M2, M3 6@∼ live M4 and M5 6@∼ live M6 because
(a; {, b}; {b}) ∈ Ref(M2) (a; {, b}; {b}) 6∈ Ref(M1)
(a; {, b, b.c}; {b.c}) ∈ Ref(M4) (a; {, b, b.c}; {b.c}) 6∈ Ref(M3)
(a; {, b}; ∅) ∈ Ref(M6) (a; {, b}; ∅) 6∈ Ref(M5)
8 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have studied the theory of safety and liveness for CCS extended with
controlled reversibility, named CCSroll. We developed characterisations of safety and
liveness preorders which are based only on forward transitions (as in [6]), thus providing
a simple proof technique for these preorders.
In CCSroll reductions are temporally ordered, forming a total order, and rollback
always returns a system to a past state. In other reversibility calculi, reductions are
causally ordered, and rollback is more involved [3, 16, 13]. We have opted for this form
of reversibility for simplicity, in order to develop a theory of weak reduction barbed
congruence for reversible languages. The adaptation of our theory to an uncontrolled
reversibility is immediate because in such a setting all system states are reachable from
each-other, thus may-testing implies should-testing (liveness and safety collapse to the
same relation).
We have identified two key properties which, if true in any reversible language then
our safety and liveness theory applies to that language. The first property can be shown
to apply in a language with controlled, causal reversibility (e.g., [12]) and therefore
our safety theory applies to such languages. The problem of determining whether the
second property applies to [12] was insurmountable to us and remains an open question
which we hope future work will be able to answer.
We have showed that with respect to safety, total reversibility is a conservative ex-
tension of CCS. With respect to liveness, however, adding total reversibility to CCS
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distinguishes more systems. The characterisations we have developed for reversibility
are fundamentally different than those for communicating transactions [7], illuminating
the difference between the two constructs. To our knowledge, this work provides the
first characterisations of safety, liveness and testing for reversible calculi.
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A Omitted Definitions and Lemmas
Definition 15 (Configuration free keys). The set of keys of a configurationM , written
keys(M), is inductively defined as follows:
keys(0) = 0 keys(νa.M) = keys(M)
keys(M ‖ N) = keys(M) ∪ keys(N) keys(k:P ) = {k} ∪ keys(P )
keys([k0:P ; k]) = {k0, k} ∪ keys(P ) keys(P ‖ Q) = keys(P ) ∪ keys(Q)
keys(
∑
i∈I
αi(γ).Pi) =
⋃
i∈I
keys(Pi) keys(rl〈γ〉) = ∅
keys(rl〈k〉) = {k} keys(νa.P ) = keys(P )
keys(recX(γ).P ) = keys(P ) keys(X) = ∅
Lemma 7. If M
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′ and M 〈k〉↪−−→M ′′ then M ′ =M ′′.
Proof. By induction on M .
Lemma 8.
1. If M1 ≡ N1 〈k〉↪−−→ N2 then there exists M2 such that M1 〈k〉↪−−→M2 ≡ N2.
2. If M1 $ N1
〈k〉
↪−−→ N2 then there exists M2 such that M1 〈k〉↪−−→M2 $ N2.
Proof. 1. By induction on the derivation of M1 ≡ N1, with case analysis on the last
applied axiom. We consider some key cases.
M1 = N
′
1 and N1 = N ′1 ‖ 0 . By hypothesis we have that N ′1 ‖ 0
〈k〉
↪−−→ N ′′2 ‖
0, which by rule RLPAR implies that N ′1
〈k〉
↪−−→ N ′′2 , and we can conclude by
noticing that N ′′2 ≡ N ′′2 ‖ 0
M1 =M
′ ‖ N ′ and N1 = N ′ ‖M ′ . By hypothesis we have that N ′ ‖ M ′ 〈k〉↪−−→
N ′1 ‖M ′1, with M ′
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′1 and N ′
〈k〉
↪−−→ N ′1. Hence also M ′ ‖ N ′
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′1 ‖
N ′1 with M
′
1 ‖ N ′1 ≡ N ′1 ‖M ′1, as desired.
M1 = k
′:νa.P and N1 = νa.k′:P . By hypothesis, we have that N1
〈k〉
↪−−→ N2. We
have to distinguish two cases, either k = k′ or k 6= k′. In the first case we have
that νa.k′:P
〈k〉
↪−−→ νa.0 and k′:νa.P 〈k〉↪−−→ 0 and we can conclude by noticing
that νa.0 ≡ 0. The second case trivially holds.
M1 = k:(P ‖ Q) and N1 = k:P ‖ k:Q . By hypothesis, we have that N1 〈k〉↪−−→
N2. We have to distinguish two cases, either k = k′ or k 6= k′. In the first
case we have that k:P ‖ k:Q 〈k〉↪−−→ 0 ‖ 0 since k:P 〈k〉↪−−→ 0 and k:Q 〈k〉↪−−→ 0. But
also k:(P ‖ Q) 〈k〉↪−−→ 0 and we can conclude by noticing that 0 ≡ 0 ‖ 0.
2. By induction on the length of the derivation of M1 $ N1. The proof is similar to
the previous case. 
Lemma 9. For any key k and term M such that k ] M , M
〈k〉
↪−−→M .
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Proof. By structural induction on M .
Lemma 10 (Forward-Backward). If D `M (k)−−⇀ D′ `M ′ then there exists M ′′ such
that D′ `M ′ 〈k〉↪−−→ D `M ′′ and M ≡M ′′.
Proof. By induction on M
(k)−−⇀ M ′, using lemma 8 in the case of REQV and lemma 9
in the case of RPAR.
Lemma 11. If M
(k)−−⇀M ′ then either
M ≡ νa˜. (k0:P ‖ N) P τ(k)7−−−→ P ′
M ′ ≡ νa˜. (k:P ′ ‖ [k0:P ; k] ‖ N) k ] M, k0, P,N
or
M ≡ νa˜. (k1:P ‖ k2:Q ‖ N) P a(k)7−−−→ P ′
M ′ ≡ νa˜. (k:P ′ ‖ k:Q′ ‖ [k1:P ; k] ‖ [k2:Q; k] ‖ N) Q a(k)7−−−→ Q′ k ] M, k1, P, k2, Q,N
for some a˜, k˜, P,Q, P ′, Q′, N .
Proof. By induction on the transition M
(k)−−⇀M ′.
Lemma 12. If M
(k)−−⇀M ′ then keys(M ′) ⊆ keys(M) ∪ {k}.
Proof. By induction on the transition.
Lemma 13. If M
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′ then keys(M ′) ⊆ keys(M) \ {k}.
Proof. By induction on the transition.
Lemma 14. If M ≡ N then keys(M) = keys(N).
Proof. By induction on the derivation M ≡ N .
Lemma 15. Let M
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′ and N ∈M ′ with N = k:P or [µ; k], for some k, µ, and
P . Then it must be N ∈M .
Proof. By induction on the transition.
Lemma 16. Let M
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′ and M1 ∈M and k ] M1. Then M1 ∈M ′.
Proof. By induction on the rollback transition.
Lemma 17. If wf(D `M) and D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ `M ′ then D′ `M ′ −⇀∗ D `M .
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Proof. By RLSYS from fig. 3 we have
M
〈k1〉
↪−−→M1 · · · 〈kn〉↪−−→Mn =M ′ D = (k1 ≺ . . .≺ kn ≺D′)
By definition 2:
M
〈k1〉
↪−−→M ′1 · · ·
〈kn〉
↪−−→M ′n
M
(k1)←−−M ′1 · · ·
(kn)←−−−M ′n
By lemma 7, M1 =M ′1, . . . , Mn =M
′
n =M
′, from which the result follows.
Corollary 1. If wf(D `M) and D `M ↪−→ D′ `M ′ then D′ `M ′ −⇀∗ D `M .
Keys in well-formed systems are nested according to the causality relation.
Lemma 18 (Syntactic Causality). If wf(D `M) then
1. Memory Causality: If [µ; l] ∈M and k ∈ keys(µ) then D ` l ≺+ k.
2. Process Causality: If l:P ∈M and k ∈ keys(P ) then D ` l ≺∗ k.
Moreover, well-formed systems can roll back any memory, and the memories they
contain are products of binary communication.
Lemma 19 (Roll Back Any Memory). If wf(D`M) and [µ; k] ∈M thenD`M 〈k〉↪−−→
D′ `M ′, for some D′ and M ′.
Lemma 20 (Binary Communication). If wf(D`M) andM ≡ νa˜.([µ1; k] ‖ [µ2; k] ‖
N) then for all [µ; l] ∈ N , k 6= l.
Lemma 21 (Preservation of Well-Formedness). Let wf(D `M); then:
1. If M ≡ N then wf(D `N).
2. If M = νa.N then wf(D `N).
3. If D `M (k)−−⇀ D′ `M ′ then wf(D′ `M ′).
4. if D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ `M ′ then wf(D′ `M ′).
5. If D `M → D′ `M ′ then wf(D′ `M ′).
Proof. The first property follows from lemmas 8 and 14. The second property follows
by the definition of keys and rule RLν of fig. 3.
To prove the third property we derive D′ = k ≺ D by RSYS of fig. 2. We need to
show that for some M ′′: keys(M ′) ⊆ keys(D′) and M ′ 〈k〉↪−−→M ′′ and M ′′ (k)−−⇀M ′ and
wf(D `M ′′). The first follows from lemma 12. The next two follow from lemma 10
and rule REQV of fig. 2; the last follows from the first property of the lemma.
The fourth property follows by definition of well-formedness and rule BW of fig. 3,
using an induction on the number of individual rollback transitions. The last property
follows from the previous two.
Lemma 22. Let D `M (k)−−⇀ 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ `M ′. Then D = D′ and M ≡M ′.
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Proof. By lemmas 1 and 10.
Lemma 23. Let D `M (k)−−⇀ 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′ and k ] l. Then there exists M ′′ ≡M ′ such
that D `M 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′′.
Proof. We have D `M (k)−−⇀ D1 `M1 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′. By rule RSYS of fig. 2 we have
D1 = k ≺D. By lemma 10, there exists M2 ≡M such that D1 `M1 〈k〉↪−−→ D `M2.
By rule RLSYS of fig. 3 and D1 `M1 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′ we get a sequence of keys k˜
such that D1 = k˜ ≺ l ≺D′ and M1 〈k˜〉↪−−→ 〈l〉↪−→ M ′. Because D1 = k ≺D and k ] l, the
sequence k˜ must have at least one element, k. Thus there exists M ′2 and k˜
′ such that
D1 = k≺ k˜′≺ l≺D′ and M1 〈k〉↪−−→M ′2
〈k˜′〉
↪−−→ 〈l〉↪−→M ′. From lemma 1, M ′2 =M2 ≡M .
By repeated applications of lemma 8 (M ′2 ≡ M ) we get M
〈k˜′〉
↪−−→ 〈l〉↪−→ M ′′, for some
M ′′ ≡M ′. The result follows from rule RLSYS.
Corollary 2. Let D`M (k˜)−−⇀ 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′ and k˜ ] l. Then there exists M ′′ ≡M ′ such
that D `M 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′′.
Lemma 24. Let D `M (k˜)−−⇀ 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′. Then one of the following holds:
1. D `M 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′ and l ∈ D, for some M ′′, or
2. D `M (k˜
′)−−⇀ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′ and k˜ = k˜′, l, k˜′′, for some M ′′, k˜′, k˜′′.
Proof. By cases on k˜.
If k˜ ] l then the first property follows from corollary 2.
Otherwise there exist k˜′, k˜′′ such that k = k˜′, l, k˜′′ and k˜′′ ] l. In this case the result
follows from corollary 2 and lemma 22.
Lemma 25. Let D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′. Then D `M 〈l〉↪−→ D′ `M ′.
Proof. From rule RLSYS of fig. 3 we get k˜, l˜ such that D = k˜ ≺ k ≺ l˜ ≺ l ≺ D′ and
M
〈k˜〉
↪−−→ 〈k〉↪−−→ 〈l˜〉↪−→ 〈l〉↪−→M ′. The lemma is proven by an application of RLSYS.
Property 3 Let wf(k˜ ≺D `M1) and M1 〈k˜〉↪−−→M2; then D `M2 −⇀∗ k˜ ≺D `M1.
Proof. By induction on the number of k˜. The base case, k˜ = ∅ banally holds. In the
inductive case we have
kn ≺ . . .≺ k2 ≺ k1 ≺D `M1 〈kn,...,k2〉↪−−−−−−→ k1 ≺D `M2 〈k1〉↪−−→ D `M1
By applying inductive hypothesis on the reduction
〈kn,...k2〉
↪−−−−−−→, we obtain
kn ≺ . . .≺ k2 ≺ k1 ≺D `M1 〈kn,...,k2〉↪−−−−−−→ k1 ≺D `M2 −⇀∗ k˜ ≺D `M
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By Lemma 21 we have that wf(k1 ≺D `M2), and by definition of wf(·) we have that
k1 ≺D `M2 〈k1〉↪−−→ D `M1 −⇀ k1 ≺D `M2 and we can conclude by noticing that
kn≺. . .≺k2≺k1≺D`M1 〈kn,...,k2〉↪−−−−−−→ k1≺D`M2 〈k1〉↪−−→ D`M −⇀ k1≺D`M2 −⇀∗ k˜≺D`M
Corollary 3. Let wf(D1`M1) andD1`M1 〈k〉↪−−→ D2`M2; thenD2`M2 −⇀∗ D1`M1.
Lemma 26. IfD1`M1 −⇀∗ D2≺D1`M2 〈l〉↪−→ D3`M3 and l ∈ D2 thenD1`M1 −⇀∗
D3 `M3.
Proof. Let D2 = k˜1 ≺ l ≺ k˜2. We proceed by induction on the size of k˜2. In the base
case, k˜2 = ∅ we have that D1 `M1 (l)−⇀ (k˜1)−−⇀ k˜1 ≺ l `M2. By Lemma 2 we have that
there exists M ′1 ≡M1 such that k˜1 ≺ l `M2
〈l〉
↪−→ D1 `M ′1. Moreover since rollback is
deterministic, and since k˜1≺ l`M2 〈l〉↪−→ D3 `M3 by Lemma 1 we have that D1 = D3
and M ′1 =M3. We can conclude since −⇀ is closed under ≡.
In the inductive case, let k˜2 = k˜3 ≺ k′2, we have that
D1`M1 (k
′
2)−−⇀ k′2≺D1`M ′
(k˜3)−−⇀ k˜3≺k′2≺D1`M ′′
(l)−⇀ (k˜1)−−⇀ D2≺D1`M2 〈l〉↪−→ D3`M3
By inductive hypothesis we have that k′2≺D1 `M ′
(k′2)−−⇀ k′2≺D1 `M ′ −⇀∗ D3 `M3,
and sinceD1`M1 (k
′
2)−−⇀ k′2≺D1`M ′ we have thatD1`M1 −⇀∗ D3`M3, as desired.
Lemma 27. Let D1 `M1 −⇀∗ D2 `M2 ↪−→ D3 `M3. One of the following is true:
1. D3 is smaller than D1: there exists non-empty D4 such that D1 = D4 ≺D3, or
2. D3 is larger than or equal to D1: D1 `M1 −⇀∗ D3 `M3.
Proof. By induction on the number n of steps D1 ` M1 −⇀∗ D2 ` M2. In the base
case we have that D1 = D2 and M1 = M2. Moreover, since D2 `M2 ↪−→ D3 `M3,
this implies that there exists a key l ∈ D2 such that D2 = D′4 ≺ l ≺ D3 such that
D2 `M2 〈l〉↪−→ D3 `M3. And we have that 1 holds by setting D4 = D′4 ≺ l.
In the inductive case, we have that:
D1 `M1 (k1)−−⇀ D′1 `M ′1
(k˜)−−⇀ D2 `M2 ↪−→ D3 `M3
with D2 = k˜ ≺ l ≺D1 and D1 = l1 ≺D′1. By inductive hypothesis we have that if 1
holds, then D′1 = D
′
4 ≺D3 with D′4 non empty. And the property still holds by setting
D4 = k1 ≺D′4, as desired. By inductive hypothesis we have that if 2 holds, then D3 is
larger than or equal to D′1: D
′
1 `M ′1 −⇀∗ D3 `M3. And the property still holds since
D1 `M1 (k)−−⇀ D′1 `M ′1 −⇀∗ D3 `M3.
Lemma 28. If D `M −⇀∗ D `N then N =M .
Property 2 is a direct consequence of the following lemma.
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Lemma 29. Let ε `M −⇀∗ D `N and keys(M) = ∅; there exist D1 and N1:
1. ε `M −⇀∗ D1 `N1
2. if D1 `N1 −⇀∗ D′ `N ′ then D `N →∗ D′ `N ′
3. if D `N →∗ D′ `N ′ then there exists N ′′ such that D1 `N1 −⇀∗ D′ `N ′′ ≡ N ′
4. ifD1`N1 →∗ D′`N ′ then there existsN ′′ such thatD1`N1 −⇀∗ D′`N ′′ ≡ N ′
Proof. We expand the forward reduction in the assumption using rule FW of fig. 2.
ε `M (k˜)−−⇀ D `N (4)
The following set contains the states reachable from D `N with arbitrary transitions:
S = {D′ `N ′ | D `N →∗ D′ `N ′}
We take the earliest such state: let (D1 `N1) ∈ S such that D1 is a prefix of all states
in S. If there are multiple states with the same D1 then we pick one of them.
We know that ε`M −⇀∗ D`N →∗ D1`N1. Therefore, by property 1: ε`M −⇀∗
D1 `N1, which proves the first conclusion of the lemma.
Because D ` N →∗ D1 ` N1, it follows that if D1 ` N1 −⇀∗ D2 ` N2 then also
D ` N →∗ D2 ` N2, which proves the second conclusion. For the same reason, the
fourth conclusion follows from the third.
It remains to show the third conclusion.
We first establish that D1 `N1 −⇀∗ D `N ′ ≡ N , for some N ′. From lemma 3 one
of the following holds:
1. D `N −⇀∗ D1 `N ′1 ≡ N1, for some N ′1.
In this case, because D1 is the smallest prefix of all D’s in S, it must be that D =
D1 and the proof is completed by lemma 28 which gives us N = N ′1 and thus
D1 `N1 −⇀∗ D `N1 ≡ N ′1 = N .
2. D ` N 〈l〉↪−→ D0 ` N0 −⇀∗ D1 ` N ′1 ≡ N1, and D ` N →∗ D0 ` N ′0 ≡ N0, for
some l ∈ D, D0, N ′1, M0, M ′0.
Because (D0 ` N ′0) ∈ S and we took D1 to be the smallest prefix of all states in
S , it must be that D0 = D1. Thus, from lemma 28 N0 = N ′1. From corollary 3,
D1 ` N ′1 −⇀∗ D ` N . Note that wf(ε `M) and thus wf(D ` N) by lemma 21.
Therefore, using rule REQV, we derive that D1 ` N1 −⇀∗ D ` N ′ ≡ N , for some
N ′.
Hence, D1 `N1 −⇀∗ D `N ′ ≡ N , for some N ′.
It now suffices to show that ifD1`N1 →∗ D′`N ′ thenD1`N1 −⇀∗ D′`N ′′ ≡ N ′,
for some N ′′. We prove this by induction on the number of reductions. The base case is
trivial.
In the inductive case we have D1 `N1 →∗ D2 `N2 → D′ `N ′. By the induction
hypothesis we get D1 `N1 −⇀∗ D2 `N ′2 ≡ N2, for some N ′2. Therefore, D2 `N ′2 →
D′`N ′′ ≡ N ′, for someN ′′. If this (→) reduction is a forward transition then the proof
is completed. Otherwise D1 ` N1 −⇀∗ D2 ` N ′2 ↪−→ D′ ` N ′′ ≡ N ′. From lemma 27
we get that either:
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Tα
P
α(k)7−−−→ P ′ k ] D
D |= l:P a(k)−−−→ (k ≺D) |= k:P ′ ‖ [l:P ; k]
TPAR
D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ k ] N
D |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ ‖ N
TSYNC
D |=M a(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ D |=N a(k)−−−→ D′ |=N ′
D |=M ‖ N τ(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ ‖ N ′
Tν
D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ α ]n a
D |= νa.M α(k)−−−→ D′ |= νa.M ′
TEQV
M $ N D |=N α(k)−−−→ D′ |=N ′ N ′ $M ′
D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′
Fig. 7. LTS Transitions Based on Forward Moves
– there exists non-empty D3 such that D1 = D3 ≺D′. In this case we have that D′
is a strict prefix of D1. Moreover (D′ `N ′′) ∈ S. However we took D1 to be the
smallest D1 ∈ S, which leads to contradiction. Thus this case is vacuously true.
– D3 is larger than or equal to D1: D1 `M1 −⇀∗ D′ `N ′′ ≡ N ′, as needed. 
Definition 16 (Well-Formed Configuration). D |=M is well-formed (wf(D |=M))
when
1. keys(M) ⊆ keys(D) and
2. if D = k≺D′ then there exist α and M ′ such that M 〈k〉↪−−→M ′ and D′ |=M ′ α(k)−−−→
D |=M and wf(D′ |=M ′).
Well-formedness in the reduction semantics implies well-formedness in the LTS,
but not the converse.
Lemma 30. If wf(D `M) then wf(D |=M).
Lemma 31. Let wf(D |=M) and wf(D |=N); then:
1. wf(D |= νa.M) and wf(D |=M ‖ N).
2. If M = νa.M ′ then wf(D |=M ′).
3. If M =M1 ‖M2 then wf(D |=M1) and wf(D |=M2).
4. If M ≡M ′ then wf(D |=M ′).
5. If D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ `M ′ then wf(D′ `M ′).
Lemma 32 ((≡) is a Strong Bisimulation). If M ≡ N and D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′
then there exists N ′ ≡M ′ such that D |=N α(k)−−−→ D′ |=N ′.
Lemma 33. Let D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′; then either
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1. α = τ and
M ≡ νa˜. (l:P ‖ N) M ′ ≡ νa˜. ([l:P ; k] ‖ k:P ′ ‖ N)
with P
τ(k)7−−−→ P ′ and D′ = k ≺D otherwise;
2. α = τ and
M ≡ νa˜. (l1:P ‖ l2:Q ‖ N) M ′ ≡ νa˜. ([l1:P ; k] ‖ [l2:Q; k] ‖ k:P ′ ‖ Q′)
with P
a(k)7−−−→ P ′, Q a(k)7−−−→ Q′ and D′ = k ≺D otherwise;
3. α 6= τ and
M ≡ νa˜. (l:P ‖ N) M ′ ≡ νa˜. ([l:P ; k] ‖ k:P ′ ‖ N)
with P
α(k)7−−−→ P ′ and D′ = k ≺D. uunionsq
Corollary 4. D `M −⇀∗ D′ `M ′ iff D |=M τ˜(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′′ with M ′′ ≡M ′.
Lemma 34. If C α(k)−−−→ C′ then k ] C.
Lemma 35. If C α(k)−−−→ C′ and p is a name permutation then pC α(pk)−−−→ pC′.
Lemma 36 (Transition Weakening/Strengthening). Let D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=N .
1. If D = D1 ≺ l ≺D2 then D1 ≺D2 |=M α(k)−−−→ k ≺D1 ≺D2 |=N .
2. If D = D1≺D2 and l ] D, k then D1≺ l≺D2 |=M α(k)−−−→ k≺D1≺ l≺D2 |=N .
Lemma 37 (Canonical Traces are Typed). Let t be a canonical trace with t ] D.
There exists D′ such that (D ` t . D′).
Lemma 38 (Typed Traces are Canonical). If (D ` t . D′) then t is canonical.
Lemma 39. If (D ` t . D′) then t ] D and keys(D′) = keys(D) ∪ keys(t).
Our characterisations of the safety and liveness preorders are based on zipping and
un-zipping typed traces. The definition of zipping, shown in fig. 8, is straightforward.
Moreover, trace typing is invariant to key permutation. LTS traces are canonical by
construction and thus they are typable.
Lemma 40. If D1 ‖ D2  D, then keys(D1) ⊆ keys(D) and keys(D2) ⊆ keys(D).
Lemma 41 (Zipping Inversion). If D1 ‖ D2  (k ≺ D) then one of the following
holds:
1. (k ≺D1) ‖ D2  k ≺D,
2. D1 ‖ (k ≺D2) k ≺D, or
3. (k ≺D1) ‖ (k ≺D2) k ≺D.
20
ε ‖ ε  ε (Zε)
(k ≺D1) ‖ D2  k ≺D if D1 ‖ D2  D and k ] D1, D2 (ZL)
D1 ‖ (k ≺D2) k ≺D if D1 ‖ D2  D and k ] D1, D2 (ZR)
(k ≺D1) ‖ (k ≺D2) k ≺D if D1 ‖ D2  D and k ] D1, D2 (ZSYNC)
ZT
D1 ‖ D2  D
(D1 `  . D1) ‖ (D2 `  . D2) (D `  . D)
ZTL
(k ≺D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (k ≺D ` t . D′)
(D1 ` α(k), t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (D ` α(k), t . D′)
ZTR
(D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (k ≺D2 ` t2 . D′2) (k ≺D ` t . D′)
(D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` α(k), t2 . D′2) (D ` α(k), t . D′)
ZTSYNC
(k ≺D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (k ≺D2 ` t2 . D′2) (k ≺D ` t . D′)
(D1 ` a(k), t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` a(k), t2 . D′2) (D ` τ(k), t . D′)
Fig. 8. Zipping Traces.
Lemma 42. If (D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (D ` t . D′1) then D1 ‖ D1  D.
Lemma 43 (Key Permutation). Let p be a key permutation. Then
1. If (D ` t . D′) then (pD ` pt . pD′).
2. If C t−→ C′ then pC pt−→ pC′.
Lemma 44. Let D |=M t−→ D′ |=M ′. Then:
1. (D ` t . D′).
2. If (D ` t . D′′) then D′ = D′′.
Proof. We prove the two properties by induction on the length n of the trace t.
1. The base case n = 0 and t =  trivially holds, sinceD = D′ and (D`.D). In the
inductive case, we have that t = α(k), t′, withD|=M α(k)−−−→ D1|=M1 t
′
−→ D′|=M ′.
According to Definition 6, in order to show (D ` α(k), t′ . D′) we have to prove
(k≺D` t′ .D′). By inductive hypothesis on the derivationD1 |=M1 t
′
−→ D′ |=M ′
we have that (D1 ` t′ . D′) and since D |=M α(k)−−−→ D1 |=M1 by Lemma 33 we
have that D1 = k ≺D and we can conclude (k ≺D ` t′ . D′).
2. The base case n = 0 and t =  trivially holds. In the inductive case, we have
t = α(k), t′ and D |=M α(k)−−−→ D1 |=M1 t
′
−→ D′′ |=M ′. By hypothesis we have
that (D ` α(k), t′ . D′) and we can derive (k ≺ D ` t′ . D′). By Lemma 33 we
have that D |=M α(k)−−−→ k ≺D |=M1, and since k ≺D |=M1 t
′
−→ D′′ |=M ′, we
can apply the inductive hypothesis and obtain that D′ = D′′, as desired. 
Lemma 45 (Unzipping Transition). LetD |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ D′ |=R′ andD1 ‖ D2 
D and wf(D1 |=M) and wf(D2 |=N). Then one of the following is true
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1. D1 |=M α(k)−−−→ D′1 |=M ′ and D′1 ‖ D2  D′ and R′ =M ′ ‖ N .
2. D2 |=N α(k)−−−→ D′2 |=N ′ and D1 ‖ D′2  D′ and R′ =M ‖ N ′.
3. D1 |=M a(k)−−−→ D′1 |=M ′ D2 |= N
a(k)−−−→ D′2 |= N ′ and D′1 ‖ D′2  D′ and
R′ =M ′ ‖ N ′ and α = τ .
Two typed complementary traces can be zipped provided the keys annotating their
τ actions do not overlap. Their zipped trace will contain only τ actions.
Lemma 46. Let (D1`t1.D′1) and (D2`t2.D′2) andD1 ‖ D2  D3 and obs(t1) = t′1
and obs(t2) = t′2 and t
′
1 = t
′
2 and keys(t1)\keys(t′1) ] D′2 and keys(t2)\keys(t′2) ] D′1.
Then there exists t3, D′3 such that (D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (D3 ` t3 . D′3)
and D′1 ‖ D′2  D′3 and obs(t3) = .
The set Tr(C) is closed under the permutation of keys fresh from C.
Lemma 47. If t ∈ Tr(C) and p is a permutation such that p ] C then pt ∈ Tr(C).
Theorem 5 (Soundness). For any initial systemsM andN ,M @∼tr N impliesN @∼safe
M .
Proof. We assume M @∼tr N , for initial systems M and N . According to definition 4,
we need to show that for all tests T , ε `M ‖ ε:T⇓ω implies ε `N ‖ ε:T⇓ω .
Let ε `M ‖ ε:T⇓ω , for test T . From definition 3, Let ε `M ‖ ε:T →∗ D ` O↓ω ,
for some system O. From property 1, the same system is reached with only forward
reductions: ε `M ‖ ε:T −⇀∗ D ` O↓ω . From corollary 4 we get ε |=M ‖ ε:T t−→
D |=O′ ≡ O for t = k˜(τ).
Since ε ‖ ε ε we unzip the trace t by applying Proposition 1 and obtain:
ε |=M t1−→ D1 |=M1 (ε ` t1 . D1) ‖ (ε ` t2 . D2) (ε ` t . D)
ε |= ε:T t2−→ D2 |= T2 O′ $M1 ‖ T2 obs(t1) = obs(t2)
Moreover, since O′↓ω and ω is only present in T , T2↓ω . By definition 7, obs(t1) ∈
Tr(ε |=M), and by M @∼tr N , obs(t1) ∈ Tr(ε |= N). Therefore, there exists trace t3
with obs(t1) = obs(t3) such that ε |=N t3−→ D3 |=N3 and, by lemma 44, (ε` t3 .D3).
The keys in the observable part of t3 are the same as in those of t1. However, t3 may
contain τ -actions whose keys overlap with the keys of τ -actions in t2. For this reason
we invent a permutation p which maps all τ keys of t3 to fresh keys. Because t3 ]
(ε |= N) (from lemma 39, wf(ε |= N)) we get p ] (ε |= N). Thus from lemma 43,
ε |= N t4−→ D4 |= N4, where t4 = pt3, D4 = pD3 and N4 = pN3. From lemma 44,
(ε ` t4 . D4). Moreover, because p ] obs(t3), we have obs(t1) = obs(t4) = obs(t2),
and by construction of p and lemma 39: keys(t4)\keys(obs(t4)) ] keys(t2) = keys(D2)
and keys(t2) \ keys(obs(t2)) ] keys(t4) = keys(D4). Thus we can apply lemma 46 and
obtain (ε ` t4 . D4) ‖ (ε ` t2 . D2) (ε ` t′ . D′) with obs(t′) = . By the Zipping
proposition (Proposition 2) we get that for some O′′, ε |= N ‖ ε:T t
′
−→ D′ |= O′′ with
O′′ $ N4 ‖ T2. Therefore, by corollary 4, ε ` N ‖ ε:T −→∗ D′ ` O′′′ ≡ N4 ‖ T2↓ω .
Thus ε `N ‖ ε:T⇓ω .
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Theorem 6 (Completeness). For any initial systems M and N , M @∼safe N implies
N @∼tr M .
Proof. Let M @∼safe N for initial systems M and N . We must show that Tr(N) ⊆
Tr(M).
We take observable t ∈ Tr(N). By definition, ε |=N t1−→ D1 |=N1, for some D1,
T1, t1 with obs(t1) = t. From lemma 4, ε |= Tests(t) t−→ D2 |= T2↓ω , for some D2,
T2. By lemma 44, (ε ` t1 .D1) and (ε ` t . D2). Moreover, keys(t1) \ keys(obs(t1)) ]
keys(obs(t1)) = keys(t) = keys(t) and by lemma 39, keys(t) = keys(D2). Because t
is observable, keys(t)\keys(obs(t)) = ∅ ] D1. Thus we can apply lemma 46 and obtain
(ε`t1.D1) ‖ (ε` t.D2) (ε`t0.D) for some t0,D with obs(t0) = . By the Zipping
proposition (Proposition 2) we get that for someO, ε |=N ‖ ε:Tests(t) t0−→ D |=O with
O $ N1 ‖ T2. Therefore, by corollary 4, ε`N ‖ ε:Tests(t) −⇀∗ D′`O′ ≡ N1 ‖ T2↓ω ,
and ε `N ‖ ε:Tests(t)⇓ω .
By M @∼safe N , we get ε ` M ‖ ε:Test
s(t)⇓ω , thus ε ` M ‖ ε:Tests(t) →∗
D′ ` O′′↓ω . From property 1, ε ` M ‖ ε:Tests(t) −⇀∗ D′ ` O′′↓ω . Therefore, by
corollary 4, ε `M ‖ ε:Tests(t) t
′
0−→ D′ ` O′′′ ≡ O′′↓ω , for some t′0 and O′′′ such that
obs(t′0) = . By the Unzipping Proposition (Proposition 1) we obtain:
ε |=M t3−→ D3 |=M3 (ε ` t3 . D3) ‖ (ε ` t4 . D4) (ε ` t′0 . D′)
ε |= ε:Tests(t) t4−→ D4 |= T4 O′′′ $M4 ‖ T4 obs(t3) = obs(t4)
Therefore obs(t4) ∈ Tr(M). From lemma 4, there exists permutation p such that pt =
t4. Because t is observable, obs(t4) = pt, and by lemma 47, t ∈ Tr(M) (note ppt = t).
Lemma 48. Let (t;V ;W ) be a refusal; then:
1. For all k ] t, there exists D such that ε`Testl(t;V ;W ) t,τ(k)−−−−→ D |=Testl(V ;W ).
2. For all t ∈ V and (k ≺D) ] t, there exists T such that D |= Testl(V ;W ) τ(k), t−−−−→
D′ |= T .
3. If D |= Testl(V ;W ) α(k),t−−−−→ D′ |= T then α = τ and t ∈ V and D′ |= T↓rl〈k〉.
4. Testl(V ;W )6 ↓ω .
5. For all t ∈W and D ] t, there exists T such that D |=Testl(V ;W ) t−→ D′ |= T↓ω .
6. If t ∈W and D |= Testl(V ;W ) t−→ D′ |= T then T↓ω .
7. If D |= Testl(V ;W ) t−→ D′ |= T↓ω then t ∈W .
Refusal sets are closed under subset of their second and third elements.
Lemma 49 (Subset and Key Permutation Closure of Ref). Let (t;V ;W ) ∈ Ref(M)
and (t′;V ′;W ′) is a refusal such that V ′ ⊆ V and W ′ ⊆ W and t = pt′ (p a key
permutation). Then (t′;V ′;W ′) ∈ Ref(M).
Theorem 7 (Soundness). For initial systems, M @∼ ref N implies N @∼ live M .
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Proof. Let M @∼ ref N and T be a liveness test. We need to show that N shd T implies
M shd T (definition 5). We prove the contra-positive: M shd T implies N shd T . Let
Mshd T . By definition 5, there exists D0 `O0 such that
ε`M ‖ ε:T →∗ D0`O0 and ∀(D′`O′). D0`O0 →∗ D′`O′ implies D′`O′ 6 ↓ω
From property 1, the same system is reached with only forward reductions:
ε`M ‖ ε:T −⇀∗ D0`O0 and ∀(D′`O′). D0`O0 →∗ D′`O′ implies D′`O′ 6 ↓ω
Note that from D0 ` O0 we can reach systems with forward or rollback transitions.
However, we apply lemma 29 and get D `O such that
ε `M ‖ ε:T −⇀∗ D `O
∀(D′ `O′). D `O →∗ D′ `O′ implies D′ `O′ 6 ↓ω
∀(D′ `O′). ∃O′′. D `O →∗ D′ `O′ implies D `O −⇀∗ D′ `O′′ ≡ O′ (5)
Using corollary 4 we derive
ε |=M ‖ ε:T t−→ D |=O′ ≡ O t = k˜(τ)
∀t′, (D′ `O′). obs(t′) =  and D |=O t
′
−→ D′ `O′ implies D′ |=O′ 6 ↓ω (6)
∀t′, (D′ `O′). obs(t′) =  and D |=O t
′
−→ D′ `O′ implies D′ |=O′ 6 ↓rl〈D〉 (7)
Note that (7) follows from (5). Since ε ‖ ε  ε we unzip the trace t by applying
Proposition 1 and obtain:
ε |=M t1−→ D1 |=M1 (ε ` t1 . D1) ‖ (ε ` t2 . D2) (ε ` t . D) (8)
ε |= ε:T t2−→ D2 |= T2 O′ $M1 ‖ T2 obs(t1) = obs(t2) (9)
We take
V = {obs(t) | ∃C. D2 |= T2 t−→ C} W= {obs(t) | ∃C. D2 |= T2 t−→ C↓ω}
∪ {obs(t) | ∃C. D2 |= T2 t−→ C↓rl〈D2〉}
and argue that (obs(t1);V ;W ) ∈ Ref(M) according to definition 13. Because of (8)
and (9), it suffices to show that V ∩ Roll(D1 |=M1) =W ∩ Tr(D1 |=M1) = ∅:
– V ∩ Roll(D1 |= M1) = ∅: By contradiction. Assume this is not the case. Then
there exist s1, s2, D′1, D
′
2, D
′, O′′, O′′′ such that obs(s1) = obs(s2) = s and
D1 |=M1 s1−→ D′1 |=M ′1↓rl〈D1〉 and D2 |= T2
s2−→ D′2 |= T ′2 and (D1 ` s1 . D′1) ‖
(D2 ` s2 .D′2) (D ` τ˜(k) .D′) and D `M1 ‖ T2 −⇀∗ D′ `O′′
〈l〉
↪−→ D′′ `O′′′
with l ∈ D (using lemmas 43 and 46 and Proposition 2). This contradicts (7). Thus
it is necessary V ∩ Roll(D1 |=M1) = ∅.
– W ∩ Tr(D1 |= T1) = ∅: With a similar argument, this is necessary for (6) and (7)
to hold.
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By M @∼ ref N , we get (obs(t1);V ;W ) ∈ Ref(N). Using lemmas 39, 39, 43, 44
and 46 and Proposition 2 we derive that there exist t3, D3, N3, t′, D′, O′′ and O′′′ such
that V ∩ Roll(D3 |= N3) = W ∩ Tr(D3 |= N3) = ∅ and ε |= N t3−→ D3 |= N3 and
obs(t3) = obs(t1) and (ε ` t3 . D3) ‖ (ε ` t2 . D2)  (ε ` t′ . D′) and obs(t′) = 
and ε |=N ‖ ε:T t
′
−→ D′ |=O′′ ≡ N3 ‖ T2 and ε`N ‖ ε:T −⇀∗ D′ |=O′′′ ≡ N3 ‖ T2.
It remains to establish that D′ `N3 ‖ T2 6⇓ω .
We first show by contradiction that
if D′ `N3 ‖ T2 →∗ D′′ `O(4) then D′ `N3 ‖ T2 −⇀∗ D′′ `O(4) (10)
Suppose that D′ ` N3 ‖ T2 →∗ D′ ` O(4) → D′′′ ` O(5) is the smallest trace for
which (10) does not hold. Then D′ ` N3 ‖ T2 −⇀∗ D′ ` O(4) 〈l〉↪−→ D′′′ ` O(5) and
l ∈ D′. Thus D′ `N3 ‖ T2 −⇀∗ D′ `O(4)↓rl〈l〉.
By corollary 4, D′ |=N3 ‖ T2 τ˜(k)−−−→ D′ |=O(6)↓rl〈l〉, for some O(6) ≡ O(4). From
Proposition 1 we obtain:
D3 |=N3 t4−→ C4 D2 |= T2 t5−→ C5 obs(t4) = obs(t5)
and either C4↓rl〈D3〉 or C5↓rl〈D2〉. If it is the former, we observe that obst4 ∈ V by
construction of V and thus V ∩ Roll(D3 |= N3) 6= ∅, which is a contradiction. If it
is the latter, we observe that in this case obst4 ∈ W by construction of W and thus
Q ∩ Tr(D3 |=N3) 6= ∅, which is again a contradiction. Therefore (10) must be true.
Due to (10) it remains to show that for all D(7) and O(7):
if D′ `N3 ‖ T2 −⇀∗ D(7) `O(7) then D(7) `O(7) 6 ↓ω (11)
Again we prove this by contradiction. Assume D′ ` N3 ‖ T2 −⇀∗ D(7) ` O(7)↓ω .
By corollary 4, D′ |= N3 ‖ T2 τ˜(k)−−−→ D(7) |= O(8)↓ω , for some O(8) ≡ O(6). From
Proposition 1:
D3 |=N3 t6−→ C6 D2 |= T2 t7−→ C7 obs(t6) = obs(t7)
and C7↓ω . By construction of W , obs(t6) ∈ W . Therefore W ∩ TrD3 |=N3 6= ∅
which contradicts the definition of (obs(t1);V ;W ) ∈ Ref(N). Therefore it must be
that D′ `N3 ‖ T2 6⇓ω and thus N @∼ live M .
B Omitted Proofs
Proof (Proof of lemma 1 on p. 5). By RLSYS of fig. 3 we get
D = (k1 ≺ . . .≺ km ≺ k ≺D′) M 〈k1〉↪−−→M1 · · · 〈km〉↪−−−→Mm 〈k〉↪−−→M ′
because of D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ `M ′, and
D = (k′1 ≺ . . .≺ k′n ≺ k ≺D′′) M
〈k′1〉↪−−→M ′1 · · ·
〈k′n〉↪−−→M ′n
〈k〉
↪−−→M ′′
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because of D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′′ `M ′′. By definition of dependency histories, k appears
only once in D, therefore m = n, ki = k′i and D
′ = D′′. We show M ′ = M ′′ by
induction on n and lemma 7.
Proof (Proof of lemma 2 on p. 5). By lemmas 8 and 10 and induction on n, we get
D′ `M ′ 〈ln〉↪−−→ . . . 〈l1〉↪−−→ 〈k〉↪−−→ D `M ′′ ≡ M . Thus M ′ 〈ln〉↪−−→ . . . 〈l1〉↪−−→ 〈k〉↪−−→ M ′′ ≡ M
and D′ = ln≺ . . .≺ l1≺k≺D, and we derive D′ `M ′ 〈k〉↪−−→ D`M ′′ ≡M as needed.
Proof (Proof of lemma 3 on p. 7). By induction on the number of rollback transitions
in D `M →∗ D′ `M ′.
Base case: the reduction has no rollback transitions. The first property trivially
holds.
Inductive case: the reduction can be decomposed (via the rules FW and BW of figs. 2
and 3, respectively) to:
D `M −⇀∗↪−→ D1 `M1 →∗ D′ `M ′ because D `M (k˜1)−−⇀ 〈l1〉↪−−→ D1 `M1
(12)
The reduction D1 `M1 →∗ D′ `M ′ is strictly smaller than the original one, thus we
can apply the induction hypothesis and get that one of the following holds:
1. D1 `M1 −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′
From lemma 24 and (12) we have the sub-cases:
(a) D `M 〈l1〉↪−−→ D1 `M ′1 ≡ M1, for some l ∈ D. From rule REQV of fig. 2,
D1 `M ′1 −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′′ ≡M ′′ ≡M ′, for some M ′′′. The proof is completed
in this case by (12): D `M →∗ D1 `M1 ≡M ′1.
(b) D`M (k˜
′
1)−−⇀ D1`M ′1 ≡M1. The first property follows using again rule REQV.
2. D1 `M1 〈l0〉↪−−→ D0 `M0 −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′ ≡M ′ and D1 `M1 →∗ D0 `M ′0 ≡M0,
for some l0 ∈ D1, D0, M ′′, M0, M ′0.
By lemma 22, D `M (k˜1)−−⇀ 〈l0〉↪−−→ D0 `M0.
From lemma 24 we have the sub-cases:
(a) D `M 〈l0〉↪−−→ D0 `M ′′0 ≡M0 and l0 ∈ D.
From rule REQV of fig. 2, D0 `M ′′0 −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′′ ≡ M ′′ ≡ M ′, for some
M ′′′. Moreover from (12), D `M →∗ D1 `M1 →∗ D0 `M ′0 ≡M0 ≡M ′′0 ,
establishing the second conclusion of the lemma.
(b) D `M (k˜
′)−−⇀ D0 `M ′′0 ≡M0.
From rule REQV of fig. 2, D0 `M ′′0 −⇀∗ D′ `M ′′′ ≡ M ′′ ≡ M ′, for some
M ′′′, establishing the first conclusion of the lemma. 
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2 on p. 8). In the⇒ direction, from hypothesis and rules FW
and RSYS of fig. 2, we get M
(k)−−⇀ M ′. The result follows by induction on this deriva-
tion. The case REQV follows by the induction hypothesis and lemma 32.
The reverse direction follows from lemma 33.
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Proof (Proof of Proposition 1 on p. 9). By induction on the length of the trace t and
then using the preceding lemma to take cases on the transition. The base case, t = 
banally holds. In the inductive case we have that t = α(k), s with:
D |=M ‖ N τ(k)−−−→ Ds |=Ms ‖ Ns s−→ D′ |=M ′ ‖ N ′
We have three cases depending on who generated the action τ(k), either M , or N or
both.
In the first case we have that D |=M ‖ N τ(k)−−−→ Ds |= Rs, with Rs = Ms ‖ Ns,
D |=M τ(k)−−−→ Ds |=Ms and Ns = N ′. By Lemma 45 we have that D1 |=M τ(k)−−−→
D′1 |=Ms and that D′1 ‖ D2  Ds. Since obs(t) =  and t = τ(k), s we have that
obs(s) = . By inductive hypothesis onDs|=Ms ‖ Nn s−→ D′|=R′ andD′1 ‖ D2  Ds
we have that there exist M ′, N ′, D′′1 , D
′′
2 , s1 and s2 such that
Ds |=M s1−→ D′′1 |=M ′ (D′1 ` s1 . D′′1 ) ‖ (D2 ` s2 . D′′2 ) (Ds ` s . D′)
Ds |=N s2−→ D′′2 |=N ′ R′ $M ′ ‖ N ′ obs(s1) = obs(t2)
by Lemma 33 we have that Ds = k ≺ D and D′1 = k ≺ D1. We can conclude by
noticing that:
–
D |=M τ(k)−−−→ Ds |=M s1−→ D′′1 |=M ′ implies D |=M
τ(k),s1−−−−→ D′′1 |=M ′
D |=N −→ Ds |=N s2−→ D′′2 |=N ′ implies D |=N s2−→ D′′2 |=N ′
– By applying rule ZTL of Figure 8 we have that
(k ≺D1 ` s1 . D′′1 ) ‖ (D2 ` s2 . D′′2 ) (k ≺D ` s . D′) implies
(D1 ` α(k), s1 . D′′1 ) ‖ (D2 ` s2 . D′′2 ) (D ` α(k), s . D′)
The other two cases are similar.
Proof (Proof of Proposition 2 on p. 9). By induction on (D1 ` t1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 .
D′2)  (D ` t . D′). We have four cases, corresponding to the rules ZT, ZTL, ZTR
and ZSYNC of Figure 8. We will consider just the first two cases, the remaining ones are
similar to the second case.
ZT In this case we have that t1 = t2 = t = , D1 = D′1 and D2 = D
′
2. Then the
proposition banally holds.
ZTL In this case we have that t1 = α(k), s1 :
D1 |=M α(k)−−−→ Ds |=Ms s1−→ D′1 |=M ′ D2 |=N t2−→ D′2 |=N ′
By Lemma 40 we have that Ds = k ≺D1. By initial hypothesis we have that
(D1 ` α(k), s1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (D ` α(k), s . D′)
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and by applying rule ZTL of Figure 8 we can derive
(k ≺D1 ` s1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) (k ≺D ` s . D′)
We can now apply the inductive hypothesis and derive that k ≺ D |=Ms ‖ N s−→
D′ |= R′. We have now to show that D |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ k ≺ D |=Ms ‖ N . By
applying Lemma 42 on the derivation (k ≺ D1 ` s1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t2 . D′2) 
(k ≺ D ` s . D′), we have that k ≺ D1 ‖ D2  k ≺ D, and by Lemma 41
this implies that D1 ‖ D2  D. Since we are considering well formed system,
D1 |=M α(k)−−−→ Ds |=Ms implies that keys(M) ⊆ keys(D1) and by Lemma 40 we
have that keys(D1) ⊆ keys(D) and hence keys(M) ⊆ keys(D). We can now apply
Lemma 36 and obtain D |=M α(k)−−−→ k ≺ D |=Ms and by applying rule TPAR of
Figure 5 we can derive D |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ k≺D |=Ms ‖ N . We can conclude by
noticing that:
D |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ k ≺D |=Ms ‖ N s−→ D′ |=R′

Proof (Proof of lemma 18 on p. 15). In both cases, if D ` k ≺+ l then D `M would
not be able to roll back k. Moreover, in the first case, if k = l and we rolled back k we
would not be able to derive D `M with forward moves. Thus, by contradiction, both
properties must hold.
Proof (Proof of lemma 19 on p. 15). By Condition 1 of definition 2, wf(D `M) gives
us D = k1 ≺ . . . ≺ kn ≺ k ≺D′, for some k1, . . . , kn, and D′. By Condition 2 of the
same definition we get M
〈k1〉
↪−−→ M1 . . . 〈kn〉↪−−→ Mn 〈k〉↪−−→ M ′, for some M1, . . .Mn, and
M ′. Therefore D `M 〈k〉↪−−→ D′ `M ′ by Rule RLSYS of fig. 3.
Proof (Proof of lemma 20 on p. 15). By contradiction. Assume [µ; k] ∈ N . By well-
formedness (definition 2), D = k1 ≺ . . . ≺ kn ≺ k ≺ D′ and M 〈k1〉↪−−→ M1 . . . 〈kn〉↪−−→
Mn
〈k〉
↪−−→ M ′ and wf(Mn). By lemma 18, k˜, k ] µ1, µ2, µ. Therefore, by lemma 16,
[µ1; k] ∈ Mn, [µ2; k] ∈ Mn, and [µ; k] ∈ Mn. Moreover, by lemma 13, k ] M ′.
Then it is not possible to derive M ′
(k)−−⇀ Mn, because forward reductions produce at
most two memories (lemma 11). This means that Mn is not well-produced, which is a
contradiction. Thus it must be that for all [µ; l] ∈ N , k 6= l.
Proof (Proof of lemma 32 on p. 19). By induction on the derivation M ≡ N , proving
the lemma first for non-τ transitions. In the proof for τ -transitions we use the lemma
for non-τ transitions.
Proof (Proof of lemma 45 on p. 21). Since D |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ D′ |=R′, by Lemma 33
we have that D′ = k≺D. We then proceed by case analysis on the reduction D |=M ‖
N
α(k)−−−→ D′ |= R′. We have three cases: M by itself did the action, N by itself did the
action or both M and N contributed to the action.
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1. We have that D |=M α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ implies D |=M ‖ N α(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ ‖ N ,
with k ] D,M,N . Since D1 ‖ D2  D by Lemma 40 we have that keys(Di) ⊆
keys(D) with i ∈ {1, 2}, and since k ] D then k ] D1, D2. We have then D1 |=
M
α(k)−−−→ D′1 |=M ′ and by Lemma 33 we have that D′1 = k ≺D1. By rule ZTL of
fig. 8 we have that k ≺D1 ‖ D2  k ≺D, and we can conclude by noticing that
D′ = k ≺D.
2. this case is similar to the previous one.
3. We have that D |=M a(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ and D |=N a(k)−−−→ D′ |=N ′ imply D |=M ‖
N
τ(k)−−−→ D′ |=M ′ ‖ N ′, with k ] D,M,N . SinceD1 ‖ D2  D by Lemma 40 we
have that keys(Di) ⊆ keys(D) with i ∈ {1, 2}, and since k ] D then k ] D1, D2.
We have thenD1 |=M a(k)−−−→ D′1 |=M ′ andD2 |=M
a(k)−−−→ D′2 |=M ′ by Lemma 33
we have that D′1 = k ≺D1 and D′2 = k ≺D2. By rule ZTSYNC of fig. 8 we have
that k≺D1 ‖ k≺D2  k≺D, and we can conclude by noticing thatD′ = k≺D.

Proof (Proof of lemma 46 on p. 22). By induction on the structure of t1 and t2. In the
base case the that t1 = t2 =  and by definition of trace typing (Definition 6) we have
that D′1 = D1 and D
′
2 = D2. By applying rule ZT we have that
(D1 `  . D1) ‖ (D2 `  . D2) (D3 `  . D′3)
and the lemma holds by setting t3 =  and D′3 = D3. In the inductive hypothesis we
have to do a case analysis on the form of t1.
t1 = a(k), t
′
1 . Since obs(t1) = t
′
1 and obs(t2) = t
′
2 and t
′
1 = t
′
2, then there exists a(k)
such that t2 = τ˜(l), a(k), t′2 and l˜ ] D
′
1 which implies l˜ ] D1. We have then that
D1 ‖ l˜ ≺D2  l˜ ≺D3. Since we have that (l˜ ≺D2 ` a(k), t′2 . D)′2 by applying
inductive hypothesis (condition on names holds) we obtain that
(D1 ` a(k), t′1 . D′1) ‖ (l˜ ≺D2 ` a(k), t′2 . D′2) (l˜ ≺D3 ` t′3 . D′3)
with obs(t′3) =  and D
′
1 ‖ D′2  D3. Now, by applying rule ZTR n times, with n
being the size of τ˜(l) we obtain that
(D1 ` a(k), t′1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` τ˜(l), a(k), t′2 . D′2) (D3 ` τ˜(l), t′3 . D′3)
with since D′1 ‖ D′2  D3. Since obs(τ˜(l), t′3) = obs(t′3) =  we can conclude.
t1 = τ(k), t
′
1 . By initial hypothesis we have that k ] D
′
2 and this implies k ] D2. We
have then that k ≺ D1 ‖ D2  k ≺ D3. Since (k ≺ D1 ` t′1 . D′1), by inductive
hypothesis we have that
(k ≺D1 ` t′1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t′2 . D′2) (k ≺D3 ` t′3 . D′3)
withD′1 ‖ D′2  D′3 and obs(t′3) = . We can now apply rule ZTR and obtain that:
(D1 ` τ(k), t′1 . D′1) ‖ (D2 ` t′2 . D′2) (≺D3 ` τ(k), t′3 . D′3)
and we can conclude by letting t3 = τ(k), t′3 and by noticing that obs(t3) =
obs(t′3) = , as desired.
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t1 =  and t2 6=  . By initial hypothesis, t2 = τ(k), t′2 with obs(t′2) = . Moreover,
since t1 =  we have that D1 = D′1. Since D1 ‖ D2  D3 and k ] D′1 this
implies also k ] D1. We then have that D1 ‖ k≺D2  k≺D3. We can then apply
inductive hypothesis and obtain that
(D1 `  . D1) ‖ (k ≺D2 ` t′2 . D′2) (k ≺D3 ` t′3 . D′3)
with D1 ‖ D′2  D′3 and obs(t3) = . We can then apply rule ZTR and obtain
(D1 `  . D1) ‖ (D2 ` τ(k), t′2 . D′2) (D3 ` τ(k), t′3 . D′3)
as desired.
t1 = a(k), t
′
1 and t2 = a(k), t′2 . Similar to the previous case, with the use of rule ZTSYNC
to conclude.
Proof (Proof of lemma 47 on p. 22). Let t ∈ Tr(C) and p be a permutation such that p ]
C. We have C t
′
−→ C′, for some t′ and C′ with obs(t′) = t. From lemma 43, pC pt
′
−−→ pC′.
Moreover, obs(pt′) = pt and PC = C because p ] C. Thus pt ∈ Tr(C).
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